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ABSTRACT 
 
Capital market efficiency has been a popular topic for teaching and empirical research 
since Fama (1965, 1970) described the theoretical analysis of market efficiency 
(Efficient Market Hypothesis). More recently, however researchers have demonstrated 
market inefficiency by identifying systematic variations in stock returns. Among the 
most important systematic variations or anomalies are calendar effects. The existence of 
calendar or time anomalies is a contradiction to the weak form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis and suggests market inefficiency.  
 
The present paper adopts and carefully applies a procedure which examines three main 
calendar effects in thirty-one developed and developing countries: the January/turn-of-
the-year effect, the turn-of-the-month-effect and the day-of-the-week effect. The 
anomalies are tested with GARCH (1,1) model using the methodology proposed by 
Szakmary and Kiefer (2004). The research shows that the turn-of-the-year effect is not 
found in observed countries, except one, which means that the effect has totally 
disappeared during the recent years in these countries (consistent with Giovanis (2009) 
for some of the examined countries). The turn-of-the-month and the day-of-the-week 
anomalies still exist in the majority of the analyzed stock markets. In all countries where 
it is found, the returns during the turn of the month are significantly positive at 1% 
level. The day-of-the-week effect provides some variations across countries. Results of 
this study suggest that the disappearance of calendar effects with time leads to the 
increase in market efficiency. 
 
KEYWORDS: Calendar effects, anomalies, market efficiency, random walk, GARCH 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
 
Capital market efficiency has been a popular topic for teaching and empirical research 
since Fama (1965, 1970) described the theoretical analysis of market efficiency 
(Efficient Market Hypothesis). Subsequent to the Fama studies a great deal of research 
was devoted to investigating the randomness of stock price movements for the purpose 
of demonstrating the efficiency of capital markets. More recently, however researchers 
have demonstrated market inefficiency by identifying systematic variations in stock 
returns. Some of the most important systematic variations, or anomalies as they are 
referred to are Value Line’s investment recommendations, the small firm effect and 
extra-ordinary returns related to the time or the calendar effect (Boudreaux 1995: 15).  
 
The existence of calendar or time anomalies is a contradiction to the weak form of the 
Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH). The weak form of the EMH states that the market 
is efficient in past price and volume information and stock movements cannot be 
predicted using this historic information. This form infers that stock returns are time 
invariant, that is, there is no identifiable short-term time based pattern. The existence of 
seasonality or monthly effects in domestic and international markets suggests market 
inefficiency, in that investors should be able to earn abnormal rates of return 
incommensurate with the degree of risk (Francis 1993). 
 
The evidence on calendar or seasonal patterns in stock returns that has accumulated 
over years is overwhelming. Stock market returns appear to reach abnormal levels 
recurrently at particular moments of time, such as the beginning of the week, the month 
and the year. The early literature has documented such calendar effects as January effect 
(Tinic and West 1984; Thaler 1987a; Haugen and Lakonishok 1987), intra-month and 
turn-of-the-month effects (Rozeff and Kinney 1976; Lakonishok and Smidt 1988), day-
of-the-week effect (Cross 1973; Gibbons and Hess 1981; Keim and Stambaugh 1984), 
and holiday effects (Fields 1934; Ariel 1990). And the issue of the calendar effects is 
still a matter of interest of the modern researchers.  
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The present research focuses on three calendar effects mentioned below, which are 
discussed in further chapters in details. January/turn-of-the-year effect is presented by 
several studies that show unusually large positive rate of returns for stocks during the 
first few trading days of the year. Average daily stock returns around the turn of the 
month are different from the average daily returns for the rest of the month – stocks 
historically show higher returns around the turn of the month. The presence of the day-
of-the week effect is well-documented in stock markets throughout the world. The stock 
returns are found to be different for all weekdays. For example, Monday is the day of 
the week that averages a negative rate of return.  
 
Szakmary and Kiefer (2004) show that various anomalies including turn-of-the-year 
effect and weekend effect seem to have disappeared, or at least substantially weakened, 
since they were first documented. It implies that as research findings increase, market 
becomes more efficient as rational traders take advantages of anomalous behavior. In 
contrast, if those still exist both statistically and economically, there must be some other 
factors that are effective. If anomalous return behavior is not definitive enough for an 
efficient trader to make profits in trading on it, then it is not economically significant. 
This definition of market efficiency directly reflects the practical relevance of academic 
research into return behavior. It also highlights the importance of transaction costs and 
other market microstructure issues for defining market efficiency. 
 
Some of the calendar effects have been justified by theories relating to institutional 
arrangements in the markets. For example, the January effect has been linked to year-
end tax-loss selling pressure that could suppress stock prices in December, only for 
them to bounce back in early January (Keim 1983; Reinganum 1983; Gultekin and 
Gultekin 1983). Explanations offered for the strong Monday effect in stock returns data 
include delays between trading and settlements in stocks (Lakonishok and Levi 1982), 
measurement error (Keim and Stambaugh 1984), institutional factors (Flannery and 
Protopapadakis 1988), and trading patterns (Lakonishok and Maberly 1990). However 
these factors appear to explain only a small portion of the Monday effect. 
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Most of the empirical studies showed that many market anomalies occur because of the 
lack of rational traders, whose investment decisions are influenced by either simplified 
evaluation methods or factors unrelated to the investment itself. Understanding the 
causes of calendar effects is important for rationalizing observed patterns and for 
making predictions about market outcomes, including the rate of stock price adjustment 
to changes in the determining factors and the permanence of systematic deviations from 
rationality (Van der Sar 2003: 271). At a practical level, investors can build trading 
strategies based on consistent seasonality or, at least, they can determine favorable 
market entry and exit moments.  
 
 
1.1. Purpose of the research 
 
Calendar effects occur when there is a meaningful temporal change. This may occur on 
a daily, weekly, monthly or even yearly basis. Anomalies indicate either market 
inefficiency or inadequacies in the underlying asset pricing model. After they are 
documented in the academic literature, anomalies often seem to disappear, reverse or 
attenuate. The goal of the present research is to test if calendar effects exist in stock 
markets of countries from different parts of the world.  
 
The study investigates the existence of calendar effects in both developed and 
developing countries around the world, 31 in total. The variety of countries makes this 
study of particular interest for the global investor. The analyzed effects are 
January/turn-of-the-year effect, turn-of-the-month effect and day-of-the-week effect. 
The paper extends the previous research in this field for some countries during more 
recent years. The impact of the calendar effects towards the world economies is aimed 
to be discussed in the end of the study. 
 
The presence of anomalies in the stock market reflects a level of market inefficiency, 
suggesting an opportunity for investors to make abnormal gains through various trading 
and investment strategies. But this research is aimed only to discover the existence of 
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calendar effects in particular countries and can be used later for further research and 
development of various investment and trading strategies. 
 
 
1.2. Structure of the research 
 
The present research is organized as follows. The first chapter acquaints with the topic 
and its main aspects in general. Also it defines the problem and its importance to the 
world of finance, suggests the possible ways in which it can be utilized and used, and 
benefits from its exploitation. The second chapter introduces the theoretical background 
of the subject, starting with the Efficient Market Hypothesis, Random Walk Hypothesis 
and proceeding to calendar effects. Previous studies in this field are presented in the 
literature review of chapter three. Subchapters describe separately each calendar effect, 
the reasons and explanations of their occurrence and existence. Chapter four provides 
the data collection procedure and the chosen methodology. Empirical results obtained 
after the conducted tests are presented in the tables and discussed in the fifth chapter in 
details. Brief summary of the study and conclusions are reported in chapter six, 
providing the ideas for further empirical research and some discussions about the issue 
of interest.   
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2. THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
2.1. Efficient Market Hypothesis 
 
Investigating financial market efficiency, it is defined that market is efficient in 
different meanings. First of all, market can be operationally efficient, which means that 
trading is carried out quickly, reliably, and at minimum cost. Secondly, market is 
allocationally efficient. In this case funds being allocated are going to their most 
productive use. Finally, market is informationally efficient in the sense that prices were 
based on the best information available. It is important to note that in order for a market 
to be allocationally efficient, it must be also informationally efficient because allocation 
decisions are made in response to prices (Howells & Bain 2005).  
 
An issue that is the subject of intense debate among academics and financial 
professionals is the Efficient Market Hypothesis (EMH) (Samuelson 1965; Fama 1970; 
Jensen 1978). The Efficient Market Hypothesis states that at any given time, security 
prices fully reflect all available information. The implications of the efficient market 
hypothesis are truly profound. Most individuals that buy and sell securities (stocks in 
particular), do so under the assumption that the securities they are buying are worth 
more than the price that they are paying, while securities that they are selling are worth 
less than the selling price. But if markets are efficient and current prices fully reflect all 
information, then buying and selling securities in an attempt to outperform the market 
will effectively be a game of chance rather than skill. 
 
There are three forms of the EMH which are distinguished by the degree of information 
reflected in security prices: 
1. Weak form – prices reflect the information contained in the record of past 
prices; 
2. Semi-strong form – prices reflect not just past prices, but all publicly available 
information; 
3. Strong form – prices reflect all information, both public and private. 
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Weak form of efficiency assumes that future prices cannot be predicted by analyzing 
prices from the past. Excess returns cannot be earned in the long run by using 
investment strategies based on historical stock prices or other historical data. Technical 
analysis techniques will not be able to consistently produce excess returns, though some 
forms of fundamental analysis may still provide excess returns. Stock prices exhibit no 
serial dependencies, meaning that there are no “patterns” in asset prices. This implies 
that future price movements are determined entirely by information not contained in the 
price series. Hence, prices must follow a random walk. This form of EMH does not 
require that prices remain at or near equilibrium, but only that market participants are 
not able to earn profit systematically from market inefficiencies. To test the weak form 
of the hypothesis it is necessary to measure the profitability of some of the trading rules 
used by those investors who claim to find patterns in security prices (Brealey and 
Meyers 2003: 351). The present paper is aimed to check the existence of the market 
inefficiency in its weak sense by testing for calendar anomalies in the stock market 
returns. 
 
Semi-strong form of efficiency implies that share prices adjust to publicly available new 
information very rapidly and in unbiased fashion, so that no excess returns can be 
earned by trading on that information. Semi-strong form of efficiency claims that 
neither fundamental analysis nor technical analysis techniques will be able to reliably 
produce excess returns. To analyze the semi-strong form of the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, researchers measure how rapidly security prices respond to different types 
of news, such as earnings or dividend announcements, news of a takeover, or 
macroeconomic information (Brealey and Meyers 2003: 351). 
 
In strong form of efficiency share prices reflect all information, public and private, and 
no one can earn excess returns. If there are legal barriers for private information to 
become public, as with insider trading laws, strong form efficiency is impossible, except 
the cases where the laws are universally ignored. Tests of the strong form of the 
hypothesis examine the recommendations of professional security analysts and have 
looked for mutual funds or pension funds that could predictably outperform the market 
(Brealey and Meyers 2003: 354). Some researchers have found a slight persistent 
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outperformance, but just as many have concluded that professionally managed funds 
fail to recoup the costs of management. A study by Carhart (1997) examines the average 
return on nearly 1,500 U.S. mutual funds during the period of 1962–1992. In some 
years the mutual funds beat the market, but more often it is on the contrary. Carhart 
(1997) compared in his research each fund with a benchmark portfolio of similar 
securities. The conclusion was that the funds earned a lower return than the benchmark 
portfolios after expenses and roughly matched the benchmarks before expenses. 
 
The EMH is one of the results of the equilibrium in a market with rational traders that 
cannot achieve returns in excess of average market returns on a risk-adjusted basis. The 
Efficient Markets Hypothesis can be summarized as follows: 
- all investors are fully informed and they can interpret in a right way public and 
private news; 
- people are rational, and they can maximize their utility function based on the 
financial earnings/gain; 
- all the trader’s decisions are independent; 
- all investment decisions lead to prices equilibrium. 
 
The summary of the Efficient Market Hypotheses takes into account that the current 
prices of assets: 
- are the best estimation of their value; 
- are a result of all available information; 
- change immediately when new information is released.  
 
The main or the fundamental idea of the EMH is that if markets are efficient then it is 
impossible for investors to exploit information in order to earn excess returns over a 
sustained period of time (Howells & Bain 2005: 543). But this appeared to be highly 
controversial and often disputed. “The efficient markets theory reached the height of its 
dominance in academic circles around the 1970s. … Faith in this theory was eroded by 
a succession of discoveries of anomalies, many in the 1980s…” (Shiller 2003: 83). 
Scores of studies that document long-term historical anomalies in the stock market seem 
to contradict with the Efficient Market Hypothesis (Keim 1987; Lakonishok and Smidt 
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1988; Barone 1990). While the existence of anomalies is generally well accepted, the 
question of whether investors can exploit them to earn superior returns in the future is 
subject to debate. Investors evaluating anomalies should keep in mind that although 
they have existed historically, there is no guarantee they will persist in the future. If they 
do persist, transactions and hidden costs may prevent outperformance in the future. 
Investors should also consider tax effects in their taxable portfolios when evaluating 
stock strategies. 
 
Researchers that discover anomalies or styles that produce superior returns have two 
choices: (1) go public and seek recognition for discovering the technique; or (2) use the 
technique to earn excess returns. It is common to develop and use strategies that attempt 
to exploit anomalies and this in turn causes the anomaly to disappear. Further, even 
anomalies that do persist may take decades to pay off. Investors evaluating historical 
data should also consider the potential pitfalls of “data mining”. When searching large 
amounts of data, correlations between variables may occur randomly and therefore may 
have no predictive value. Some researchers believe that the weekday effect and other 
seasonals arise from data mining. For instance, Sullivan, Timmermann and White 
(2001) suggest an application of a new bootstrap procedure which fails to identify 
calendar effects. However, those calendar effects which have existed over the longest 
time frames and have been confirmed to exist in international markets and out of sample 
periods are particularly persuasive. 
 
 
2.2. Random Walk Hypothesis 
 
One hypothesis that links to the EMH is that the past prices are not correlated with the 
future ones, therefore they cannot be used to predict future prices walk or to understand 
the best moment to enter/start to operate in the market. EMH suggests that the presence 
of many traders in the markets that operate in different moment of time should 
guarantee that the market prices have a random walk near its equilibrium value. 
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In 1953 Maurice Kendall, a British statistician, presents a study on the behavior of stock 
and commodity prices. Kendall (1953) expects to find regular price cycles, but to his 
surprise they do not seem to exist and the researcher discovers that prices of stocks and 
commodities follow a random walk. When Maurice Kendall suggested that stock prices 
follow a random walk, he was implying that the price changes are independent of one 
another and have the same probability distribution, but that over a period of time, prices 
maintain an upward trend.  
 
At first, Kendall’s (1953) results strongly surprised and disturbed financial economists, 
because these results appeared to confirm the irrationality of the market. However, later 
it soon became apparent that random price movements indicate a well-functioning or 
efficient market, not an irrational one. This was proved by the Efficient Market 
Hypothesis, and in particular, the weak form. 
 
Random walk hypothesis implies that the past movement or direction of the price of a 
stock or overall market cannot be used to predict its future movement. In other words, 
random walk states that stocks take a random and unpredictable path. The chance of a 
stock's future price going up is the same as it going down. Consequently, trading rules 
and security selection procedures long advocated by “technical” analysts or “chartists”, 
which are based solely on past price movements, are not useful for the investor to 
increase his returns (Jensen 1967). Technical analysts argue that models and theories 
presented by academicians are not really captured by these statistical tests. Alexander 
(1961; 1964) and Fama and Blume (1966) examine the returns earned by various 
“filter” rules for selecting securities which are supposed to capture the essence of many 
technical theories. The evidence indicates these trading rules are not able to consistently 
earn returns superior to those of a simple buy and hold policy. So, the results of these 
studies support the random walk hypothesis. 
 
Random walk hypothesis becomes popular in 1973 when Burton Malkiel writes a book 
"A Random Walk Down Wall Street", which is now regarded as an investment classic. 
Malkiel (1973), a follower of random walk, believes it is impossible to outperform the 
market without assuming additional risk. Researcher claims that both technical analysis 
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and fundamental analysis are largely a waste of time and are still unproven in 
outperforming the markets. Malkiel (1973) constantly states that a long-term buy-and-
hold strategy is the best and that individuals should not attempt to time the markets. 
Attempts based on technical, fundamental, or any other analysis are futile. He supports 
this with statistics showing that most mutual funds fail to beat benchmark averages like 
the S&P 500. 
 
However, each hypothesis has a contradiction. Levy (1967) tests a number of trading 
rules based on technical theories. Some of his results appeared to be inconsistent with 
the theory of random walk. In his article Levy (1967) introduces interesting results 
concerning the returns earned by several mechanical stock market trading rules in the 
five-year period from October 1960 to October 1965. He calculates the returns earned 
by a number of variations of his trading rules and finds these returns generally higher 
than the returns earned on a “random selection policy.” On the basis of these results 
Levy (1967) states that for his sample period of 1960 – 1965 the usage of the technical 
stock analysis could have produced much more profitability with much lower risk than 
the principle of randomness. Therefore, in his conclusion the researcher confutes the 
random walk hypothesis. 
 
The professional stock market analysts and the academic statisticians hold a 
contradictory view on the price behavior in speculative markets. The professional 
analysts believe that there exists certain trend generating facts, knowable today, which 
guides a speculator to earn profit, provided he is able to read them correctly and timely. 
These facts are believed to generate trends rather than instantaneous jumps because 
most of the traders in the speculative markets have imperfect knowledge of these facts, 
and the future trend of prices will result from a gradual spread of awareness of these 
facts throughout the market. Those who gain the information earlier than others have an 
opportunity to earn profit. Two main schools of professional analysts, the 
“fundamentalists” and the “technicians”, agree on this basic assumption. The only 
difference lies in the methodology to gain information earlier than others. The 
“fundamentalists” seek early knowledge by studying the external factors that cause the 
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price changes. The technical analysts study price movements of the immediate past for 
predictive indication of the price movements in the near future (Alexander 1961). 
 
Some studies present evidence against the random walk hypothesis, showing that stock 
returns contain predictable elements. Much of this work is centered on the world’s 
largest stock markets as the United States, developed economies of Europe and Asia 
(Poterba and Summers 1988; Fama and French 1988; Lo and MacKinlay 1988). 
Researchers observe that stock prices do not follow a random walk and thus, reject the 
random walk model.  
 
Discovery of calendar effects also rejects the random walk hypothesis like it is 
discussed in the previous subchapter about EMH. However, failure of the random walk 
does not necessarily confer predictability. 
 
 
2.3. Calendar effects 
 
Calendar effects are anomalies in stock market returns that relate to the calendar, when 
stock market returns reach abnormal levels comparing to other periods of the day, week, 
month and year. Presence of such anomalies in any stock market contradicts with the 
concept of market efficiency as these anomalies give the opportunity to stock market 
participants to earn profit by observing these patterns.  
 
Sullivan et al. (2001) conduct the research to discover the fact whether calendar effects 
imply notions of market inefficiency or appear in a result of a data-snooping. On a basis 
of the types of calendar rules that have been studied previously by other researchers, 
authors construct a universe of calendar trading rules using permutational arguments 
that do not bias in favor of, or against, particular calendar effects. The universe contains 
nearly 9,500 different calendar effects and the best calendar rule is evaluated in the 
context of this set. Sullivan et al. (2001) use 100 years of daily data and the new 
bootstrap procedure which allows to measure distortions in statistical inference induced 
by data-snooping. They have shown that in the context of the full universe, or a 
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restricted version, of calendar rules which could be considered by investors and 
academics, the strength of the evidence on calendar effects looks much weaker. They 
use Reality-Check P-values that adjust for effects of data-snooping and observe that no 
calendar rule is capable of outperforming the benchmark market index. This appears to 
be true in all of the individual sample of periods, in the out-of-sample experiment with 
the DJIA and S&P 500 Futures data, and in the full sample using a century of data. 
They suggest that the single most significant calendar anomaly – the Monday effect – 
has indeed been identified in empirical literature.  
 
What causes the regular unusual behavior of stock market returns? Thaler (1987b) lists 
a number of institutional and behavioral reasons for calendar effects: 
1. movements in prices can be related to customs which influence the flow of funds 
in and out of the market. E.g. individuals and firms make regular payments to 
pension and mutual funds at the end of calendar month or year; 
2. “window dressing” hypothesis, when the investment managers try to clean their 
portfolios to get rid of embarrassing holdings before reporting dates, which 
coincide with the actual year-end or month-end dates; 
3. influence of the systematic arrival of good and bad news, which is mostly refers 
to the weekend effect, because usually the announcement of bad news is 
postponed until after the close of trading on Friday.   
 
A number of alternative explanations exist for the occurrence of calendar effects. Van 
der Sar (2003) distinguishes four categories. The first relies on data problems and 
spurious results. Especially the bid-ask bias has been mentioned as a driving force of 
differences between returns in the time series. The second category relies on difficult to 
observe intertemporal changes in risk. That is, the patterns do exist but are not 
anomalous. The third category relies on strategic behavior of market participants in 
anticipation to regulations and legislation. Trading frictions, both real and 
informational, and other market imperfections such as taxes, settlement procedures and 
trade gaps as well as the concentration of various kinds of payments to investors at 
particular moments of time, may distort the optimal functioning of the stock market as 
an allocation mechanism of capital in comparison to a perfect market. This fact, 
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however, does not imply that stock pricing is irrational. What counts is whether, as a 
consequence, arbitrage opportunities have been created. The fourth category relies on 
behavioral considerations. Investor irrationality such as a slow response to information 
may be due to, e.g., effects of framing, the use of heuristics and agency problems. At 
present none of these explanations, that is including the risk-based stories, is completely 
satisfactory. That is why calendar effects are often called anomalies. 
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3. LITERATURE REVIEW 
 
Research is a sequential process through which new studies are built on evidence from 
earlier papers (Sullivan et al. 2001: 32). That is why it is important to make the deep 
and broad analysis of the previous literature in the investigated field. The deeper and 
broader the analysis, the richer and the more significant the research will be. The 
present Chapter attempts to cover all the main and best-known studies on calendar 
effects in the existing literature.  
 
The table below presents the most interesting previous empirical findings in the field 
which are discussed more in details in the subchapters following afterwards.  
 
Table 1. Previous empirical findings in the field. 
 
Authors Country,  
Period 
Empirical Findings 
Panel A: January/Turn-of-the-year effect 
Wachtel (1942) US: 1927-1942 
Significant seasonal effect. First explanations of 
the January effect by the tax-loss selling 
hypothesis.  
Rozeff & Kinney 
(1976) 
US: 1904-1974 
Average return of an equal-weighted index of 
NYSE in January is significantly higher than the 
average return for other months, with exception 
of 1929 – 1940 period. 
Gultekin and 
Gultekin (1983) 
18 countries: 
1959-1979 
Provide evidence in support of the January 
effect. Monthly returns are not equal for 12 
countries from a total of 17 only at the 10% 
level.  
Choudhry (2001) 
Germany & 
UK: 1870-1913; 
US: 1871-1913 
Non-tax factors may be responsible for the 
January effect. 
Szakmary & 
Kiefer (2004) 
US:  
June 1982 – 
May 2002 
Evidence of a traditional turn-of-the-year effect, 
in both cash and futures, is confined to the pre-
1993 period. Post-1993, there are no abnormal 
returns during the turn of the year window as a 
whole. Returns in this period remain high on the 
last trading day of December, but are negative. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Chen & Singal 
(2004) 
US: 1993-1999 
Evidence in favor of the tax-loss selling 
hypothesis and little or no evidence for the other 
hypothesis.  
Kim (2006) US: 1972-2003 
Constructs a common risk factor related to 
information uncertainty caused by earnings 
volatility and claims to have found an 
improvement in explaining the abnormal returns 
in January. Systematic pattern in the residual 
returns across firm size disappears. 
Haug & 
Hirschey (2006)  
US: 1802-2004 
Abnormally high rates of return on small-
capitalization stocks during January. 
January effect in small-cap stock returns is 
remarkably consistent over time. 
Cooper, 
McConnell & 
Ovtchinnikov 
(2006) 
US: 1940-2003 
January returns have predictive power for 
market returns over the next 11 months. 
The “other January effect” persists among both 
large and small capitalization stocks and among 
both value and growth stocks. 
Moosa (2007) US: 1970-2005 
Presence of a significant January effect except 
in the most recent period, 1990-2005, when a 
strong negative July effect surfaced. 
Panel B: Turn-of-the-month effect 
Ariel (1987)  US: 1963-1981 
Changes in stock prices during turn of the 
month are found positive. Significant 
differences between the first and the second half 
of the month stock average returns: average 
returns of the last half of month are not different 
from zero, while in the first half are statistically 
significant. 
Lakonishok & 
Smidt (1988)  
US: 1897-1986 
 “Window dressing” hypothesis may be a reason 
of the turn-of-the-month effect. 
Ogden (1990)  US: 1969-1986 
Turn-of-the-month effect is likely to be 
influenced by the level of liquid profits.  
Chris & Ziemba 
(1996)  
US: 1928-1993 
The total return of the S&P 500 over this sixty-
five-year period is received mostly during the 
turn of the month. Investors making regular 
purchases may benefit by scheduling to make 
those purchases prior to the turn of the month. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Nikkinen, 
Sahlström & 
Äijö (2007)  
US: 1995-2003 
It can not be exactly proved that macroeconomic 
news announcements can influence higher 
realized returns, although the empirical results 
provide strong support in favor of 
macroeconomic news announcements. 
McConnell and 
Xu (2008)  
US: 1926-2005 
Turn-of-the-month effect is pronounced over the 
recent two decades. 
Wiley & 
Zumpano (2009) 
US: 1980-2004 
No sufficient proof that institutional investment 
impacts returns during the turn-of-the-month, 
suggesting that this calendar effect is not caused 
exclusively by institutional investors. 
Panel C: Day-of-the-week effect 
Smirlock & 
Starks (1986)  
US: 1963-1983 
Evidence of nonstationarities in the Monday 
effect. 
Condoyanni, 
O’Hanlon & 
Ward (1987) 
France: 
1969-1984 
Significant negative returns on Tuesdays and 
significant positive returns on Thursdays. 
 
Solnik & 
Bousquet (1990) 
France: 
1978-1987 
Strong and persistent negative mean returns on 
Tuesdays. 
Solnik (1990) 
France: 
1978-1989 
Significantly negative Tuesday returns. 
Chang, Pinegar 
& Ravichandran 
(1993) 
US:  
30.12.1985-
30.04.1992 
Monday’s mean returns are different from mean 
returns observed during the week. The effects 
are statistically significant in not more than two 
weeks of the month. 
Dubois & Louvet 
(1996) 
Nine countries: 
1969-1992 
Negative returns on Mondays and Tuesdays, 
positive returns on Wednesdays. 
Wang, Li & 
Erickson (1997)  
US:  
3.07.1962- 
31.12.1993 
Correlation between the Friday return and the 
Monday return, and the expiration date of stock 
options cannot justify the Monday effect. 
Brusa, Liu & 
Schulman (2000) 
US: 1990-1994 
Reverse weekend effect: Monday returns are 
significantly positive and they are higher than 
the returns of the other days of the week. Large 
firms are subjected to traditional weekend 
effects whereas small firms are exposed to the 
reverse weekend effects. 
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Table 1. (continued) 
 
Keef, Khaled & 
Zui (2009)  
Fifty countries: 
1994-2006 
In terms of information the poor countries are 
less efficient than rich countries. Monday effect 
weakening over time stands for a market 
efficiency increase. 
 
 
3.1. January/Turn-of-the-year effect 
 
The January Effect is a calendar-related anomaly in the financial market when stock 
market returns in January are higher than in other 11 months of the year. This creates an 
opportunity for investors to buy stocks for lower prices before January and sell them 
after their value increases. January has historically been the best month to be invested in 
stocks. Therefore, the main characteristics of the January Effect are an increase in 
buying securities before the end of the year for a lower price, and selling them in 
January to generate profit from the price differences. Advocates of the turn-of-the-year 
effect (Keim 1983; Gultekin and Gultekin 1983) claim that small capitalization stocks 
tend to heavily outperform large cap stocks on the last trading day of December and the 
first five trading days in January. 
 
The January effect is first mentioned by Wachtel (1942). He finds a significant seasonal 
effect using data of the Dow Jones Industrial Average from 1927 to 1942. Also, he was 
the first to explain January effect with the tax-loss selling hypothesis. He states that 
downward pressure on stock prices might be induced at year end by investors selling the 
losing stocks with the intention to realize capital losses against their taxable incomes. 
The abnormally high January return is the effect from the stock price rebounding to its 
equilibrium level when the selling pressure stops at the beginning of the year.   
 
A more formal investigation is due to Rozeff and Kinney (1976), who sometimes are 
considered to be the first to introduce the January effect to the world of finance. The 
paper presents evidence on the existence of seasonality in monthly rates of return on the 
New York Stock Exchange from 1904–1974. Researchers observe that the average 
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return of an equal-weighted index of the NYSE in January is statistically significantly 
higher than the average return for the other months, with the exception of the 1929 –
1940 period. Dispersion measures reveal no consistent seasonal patterns and the 
characteristic exponent seems invariant among months (Rozeff and Kinney 1976). They 
also explore possible implications of the observed seasonality for the capital asset 
pricing model. 
 
Thaler (1987a) examines the behavior of security prices in January. He finds that stock 
prices tend to increase in January, particularly the prices of small firms and firms whose 
stock price has declined substantially over the past few years. Also he claims that risky 
stocks earn most of their risk premiums in January.  
 
Later, Gultekin and Gultekin (1983) provide evidence in support of the January effect 
for the U.S. and other 17 industrialized countries for the period 1959-1979. The return 
data are based on the value-weighted indexes of month-end closing prices without 
dividend yields. They compute first 12 monthly autocorrelations, and find that they are 
mostly not significant except for Australia, Denmark, and Norway. They use the 
Kruskal-Wallis test for the 17 countries, and find that the monthly returns are not equal 
for 12 countries from a total of 17 only at the 10% level. The monthly returns are equal 
for Australia, France, Italy, Singapore, and the US. Except for Australia, the monthly 
returns appear to be higher at the beginning of the tax year. In Australia, the tax year 
starts in July, and in the UK, it starts in April.  
 
Haugen and Jorion (1996) note that the January effect is, perhaps the best-known 
example of anomalous behavior in security markets throughout the world. They provide 
results confirming the persistent existence of the January effect. Authors prove that the 
January effect still exists despite the fact that it was well known for reasonably long 
time and therefore should have disappeared. In their study Haugen and Jorion (1996) 
find that the January effect is stronger in case of small firms than in case of well-
established companies with high capitalization. Haugen and Jorion (1996) conclude that 
the January effect still persists to be strong 17 years after publication by Rozeff and 
Kinney (1976). 
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Stocks in general and small stocks in particular have historically generated abnormally 
high returns during the month of January. The most common theory explaining this 
phenomenon is that individual investors, who are income tax-sensitive and who 
disproportionately hold small stocks, sell stocks for tax reasons at year end (such as to 
claim a capital loss) and reinvest after the first month of the year. Small firms pay 
higher mean returns than large ones at the beginning of the year. Chen and Singal 
(2004) present a comprehensive study of several explanations and find evidence in favor 
of the tax-loss selling hypothesis and little or no evidence for the other hypothesis. 
Choudhry (2001), using pre-World war data, shows that non-tax factors may be 
responsible for the January effect. In contrast, Kim (2006) constructs a common risk 
factor related to information uncertainty caused by earnings volatility and claims to 
have found an improvement in explaining the abnormal returns in January. Although 
most researchers support the tax-loss selling hypothesis, the discussion remains open.  
 
Theoretically an anomaly should disappear as traders attempt to take advantage of it in 
advance. The January effect initially persisted long since it was discovered, but as 
documented by several researchers, it has diminished, disappeared or even reversed 
over time. Szakmary & Kiefer (2004) examine the returns, relative to the S&P 500, on 
cash indices and futures tracking smaller stocks around the turn of the year for the 
period of June 1982 – May 2002. The main focus of the study is the evolution of the 
turn-of-the-year effect through time: in particular, whether the effect diminishes or takes 
place earlier subsequent to the introduction of the S&P Midcap and Russell 2000 futures 
in 1993. In their research Szakmary & Kiefer (2004) also control for volatility 
clustering, return autocorrelation in small stock indices, and other calendar effects with 
the help of GARCH (1,1) model. The results suggest that a traditional turn of the year 
effect exists in both cash and futures during the pre-1993 period. After 1993 there are no 
abnormal returns during the turn of the year window as a whole. Authors note that 
returns in this period remain high on the last trading day of December, but they are 
negative across the first five trading days of January. In addition, post-1993, significant 
abnormal returns are observed prior to the traditional turn of the year, i.e., in the pre-
Christmas and post-Christmas windows. Szakmary & Kiefer (2004) suppose that market 
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participants may be eliminating the turn of the year effect with the help of two new 
futures contracts that fit well for this purpose. 
 
Moosa (2007) investigates the January effect in U.S. stock prices using monthly average 
data on the Dow Jones Industrial Average over the period 1970-2005. To estimate the 
seasonality he applies a dummy variable model using OLS and rolling regressions. The 
results of the study suggest the presence of a significant January effect except in the 
most recent period, 1990-2005, when a strong negative July effect appears. The study 
confirms this finding by using a more sophisticated structural time series model with an 
autoregressive structure. Moosa (2007) provides the following explanations for the 
disappearing January effect: (1) changes in accounting standards that do not make now 
a significant distinction between realized and unrealized capital gains and losses as in 
the past; (2) changes in the tax treatment of realized and unrealized gains/losses; and (3) 
lower marginal tax rates, which dampens the incentive to engage in tax motivated 
trading. Also, the researcher suggests that the possible explanation for the July effect is 
the selling pressure related to the summer holiday season in the northern hemisphere. 
Individual investors sell stocks to finance their vacations, and fund managers try to 
reduce their market risk because they cannot control their portfolios during their 
holidays. 
 
The January effect has also become important because it can be used as a predictor of 
the returns over the following 11 months, which is called the “other January effect” by 
Cooper et al. (2006). They show that January returns have predictive power for market 
returns over the next 11 months of the year even after controlling for macroeconomic 
business cycles variables, the Presidential Cycle and investor sentiment. They also find 
that the “other January effect” persists among both large and small capitalization stocks 
and among both value and growth stocks. 
 
While some researchers claim that the effect diminishes and disappears, other continue 
to prove its existence by strong evidence and profound research. Haug and Hirschey 
(2006) analyze broad samples of value-weighted and equal-weighted returns of U.S. 
equities. The study shows that there is little evidence of a January effect for large-
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capitalization stocks during 1802-2004. In contrast, abnormally high rates of return on 
small-capitalization stocks continue to be observed during the month of January. 
Researchers conclude that the January effect in small-cap stock returns is remarkably 
consistent over time and continues to present a serious challenge to the efficient market 
hypothesis even after a generation of intensive study. 
 
 
3.2. Turn-of-the-month effect 
 
The tendency of stock returns to increase during the last few days and the first few days 
of each month is called a turn-of-the-month effect. Ariel (1987) is the first to identify 
the turn-of-the-month effect in US stock prices at the beginning of one month and the 
end of the other month. He uses daily data for Center for Research in Security Prices 
(CRSP) value-weighted and equally-weighted stock index returns from 1963 through 
1981 and studies this anomaly by considering last day of one month and the first three 
days of upcoming month. Changes in stock prices in these days are found positive. 
There are significant differences between the first and second half of the month stock 
average returns, where the average returns of the last-half of month are not different 
from zero, while in the first half are statistically significant.  
 
Some researchers have posited that the turn-of-the-month effect could be the result of 
systematic trading patterns by large institutional investors. Lakonishok and Smidt 
(1988) suggest that pension fund managers and other institutional investors might be 
selling off stocks that underperform and purchasing those that have recently performed 
well in an effort to avoid a negative bias in the estimated rates of return (“window 
dressing” hypothesis).  
 
The other hypothesis which is referred to as the “preferred habitat” hypothesis is based 
on the idea that the end of each calendar month is a typical payoff date for the 
compensation of most employees in the USA. There are many employees with 
automatic contribution plans, where some portion of their monthly paycheck goes 
directly into their investment accounts providing institutional investors with excess 
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liquid profits to invest. If institutional investors quickly invest these liquid profits, it is 
likely to take place near the turn-of-the-month. In fact, Ogden (1990) provides evidence 
that the turn-of-the-month effect is likely to be influenced by the level of liquid profits. 
However, Ogden’s work did not attempt to distinguish between the impacts of 
institutional and individual investors.  
 
However, some researchers believe there is little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
the turn-of-the-month effect is caused by institutional investment. For example, Wiley 
and Zumpano (2009) argue that the impact of institutional investment may not be as 
large as some researchers have suspected. Their study provides an empirical test that 
measures the impact of the level of institutional investment on the turn-of-the-month 
effect using stock returns from a sample of 238 real estate investment trusts (REITs) 
over the period 1980 to 2004. They find that a significant change in the turn-of-the-
month effect occurred following the Omnibus Reconciliation Act of 1993 which relaxed 
the requirements on the level of institutional investment in REITs. The evidence shows 
that the dramatic rise in institutional holdings can account for a good part of this 
change. However, the authors claim that there is no sufficient proof that institutional 
investment impacts returns on the day when the turn-of-the-month effect is most 
pronounced, suggesting that this calendar effect is not caused exclusively by 
institutional investors in the market (Wiley & Zumpano 2009: 180). 
 
Chris and Ziemba (1996) present the theory that the turn-of-the-month effect results 
from cash flows at the end of the month (salaries, interest payments, etc.). They find 
returns for the turn of the month are significantly above average from 1928 to 1993 and 
that the total return of the S&P 500 over this sixty-five-year period is received mostly 
during the turn of the month. The study implies that investors making regular purchases 
may benefit by scheduling to make those purchases prior to the turn of the month. 
 
Nikkinen, Sahlström and Äijö (2007) study the turn-of-the-month and intramonth 
effects with relation to the important macroeconomic news announcements. They 
provide a new and economically plausible explanation of these phenomena examining 
S&P100. Nikkinen et al. (2007) suggest that turn-of-the-month and intramonth 
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anomalies occur because of the clustered information, and more precisely – 
macroeconomic news announcements, which are published systematically at a certain 
time point every month. But as long as the researchers take the effect of macroeconomic 
news to account both turn-of-the-month and intramonth phenomena disappear. They 
propose a measure which uses information from option-implied volatilities to account 
for the changes in expected risk premium caused by news announcements. However, 
this measure captures the effects of news announcements only partially. So, it can not 
be exactly proved that macroeconomic news announcements can influence higher 
realized returns, although the empirical results provide strong support in favor of 
macroeconomic news announcements.  
 
McConnell and Xu (2008) study CRSP daily returns for the 80-year period of 1926-
2005. Specifically, they define turn-of-the-month as beginning with the last trading day 
of the month and ending with the third trading day of the following month. They find 
that the turn-of-the-month effect is pronounced over the recent two decades such that, if 
to combine their findings with those of Lakonishok and Smidt (1988), the result is that 
over the 109-year interval of 1897-2005, on average, all of the positive return to equities 
occur during the turn-of-the-month interval. They also infer that it is not confined to 
small and low-price stocks, calendar year-ends or calendar quarter-ends, to the U.S, and 
is not due to the buying of shares at the turn-of-the-month since trading volume is not 
higher and the net flows of funds to equity funds is not systematically higher. They 
conclude that the turn-of-the-month effect in equity returns poses a challenge to both 
“rational” and “behavioral” models of security pricing and it continues to be a puzzle in 
search of a solution. 
 
 
3.3. Day-of-the-week effect 
 
Some of the most unusual empirical results indicate that the distribution of common 
stock returns is not identical for all days of the week. The day-of-the-week phenomenon 
is observed in many developed and developing markets. Numerous studies observe that 
average stock returns are negative on Mondays and abnormally positive on Fridays in 
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many countries around the world. However, there are different variations in some 
countries. Several studies provide evidence that this effect displays different patterns 
from one country to another. For example, strong negative Tuesday effect was found in 
several countries particularly in Europe and Asia: in the French stock market 
(Condoyanni, O’Hanlon & Ward 1987; Solnik & Bousqet 1990), Canadian market 
(Athanassakos & Robinson 1994), stock markets of Australia and Japan (Jaffe & 
Westerfield 1985; Dubois & Louvet 1996), stock markets of Japan and Korea (Kim 
1988), stock markets of Australia, Hong Kong, Japan, Korea, Malaysia, New Zealand, 
Philippines, Singapore, Taiwan and Thailand (Ho 1990), stock markets of eighteen 
countries (Agrawal and Tandon 1994). It is explained that in Australia, Korea, Japan 
and Singapore average returns on Tuesday are negative because of time zone 
differences relative to the U.S. and European markets. 
 
Condoyanni et al. (1987) report significant negative returns on Tuesdays and significant 
positive returns on Thursdays in France for the period 1969-1984. Tuesdays’ strongly 
negative returns may be explained by the fact that the French index is compiled before 
the US market opens. The authors suggested that France is not significantly affected by 
US returns over at least two days.  
 
In his research Connolly (1989) analyzes the robustness of the day-of-the-week and 
weekend effects to alternative estimation and testing procedures. The results show that 
sample size can distort the interpretation of classical test statistics unless the 
significance level is adjusted downward. Specification tests reveal widespread 
departures from OLS assumptions. To test the hypothesis and reported the results he 
uses robust econometric methods and a GARCH model. Connolly (1989) claims that the 
strength of the day-of-the-week and weekend effects evidence depends on the 
estimation and testing method. Both effects seem to have disappeared by 1975. 
However, in his later paper Connolly (1991) presents a posterior odds evaluation of the 
day-of-the-week and weekend effect that largely reverses earlier findings. The 
interaction of large sample sizes and fixed significance level hypothesis testing is 
identified as the likely source of disagreements between p-values and posterior 
probabilities. Analysis with informative and relatively diffuse prior distributions 
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indicates this divergence does not apparently reflect special distributional assumptions. 
Further analysis suggests that earnings announcement behavior and a small number of 
outliers may be the reason of systematically negative Monday returns in the few years 
where posterior odds favor the weekend effect hypothesis. 
 
Solnik and Bousquet (1990) focused on the period 1978-1987 and examined the CAC 
Index of Paris Bourse. Their results showed strong and persistent negative mean returns 
on Tuesdays. Also, they supported that the specific monthly settlement procedure of the 
Paris market, whereby the transactions’ settlement occurs on the last day of each month 
(liquidation date), can explain the larger positive returns observed on Fridays, but 
cannot explain the negative mean returns observed on Tuesdays. Regarding the high 
positive returns on Fridays, since most of the liquidation dates happen to be on 
Thursdays, Fridays are the first day of the new period of liquidation, hence the highest 
returns.  
 
Solnik (1990) wondered whether the settlement procedure could explain the pattern of 
daily returns observed in previous studies of the Paris Bourse. During the period 1978-
1989, the hypothesis of equality among the daily returns of all the days of the week was 
rejected at the five percent confidence level. This rejection was mostly explained by the 
negative returns on Tuesdays and to some extent by a higher return on Fridays. Because 
the major impact of the liquidation on the daily return takes place on the next day, this 
phenomenon will tend to increase the mean return observed for Fridays. To adjust for 
this, days following the liquidation were excluded. After this, the mean return on 
Fridays was no longer the highest (but was high on Wednesdays) and the returns on 
Tuesdays stayed significantly negative. The hypothesis that all mean returns are equal 
for each day of the week was still rejected at the 5% confidence level.  
 
Consistent with Connolly's (1989), (1991) evidence, Chang, Pinegar and Ravichandran 
(1993) find that sample size and/or error term adjustments render U.S. day-of-the-week 
effects statistically insignificant. They find that Monday’s mean returns are different at 
the five percent confidence level from mean returns observed throughout the week for 
the period from December 30, 1985 to April 30, 1992. In contrast, day-of-the-week 
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effects in seven European countries and in Canada and Hong Kong are robust to 
individual sample size or error term adjustments, and day-of-the-week effects in five 
European countries survive the simultaneous imposition of both types of adjustments. In 
most countries where day-of-the-week effects are robust, however, the effects are 
statistically significant in not more than two weeks out of the month. These findings are 
inconsistent with explanations of the day-of-the-week effect based on institutional 
differences or on the arrival of new information. Thus, in the absence of other potential 
explanations, evidence in this study further complicates the international day-of-the-
week effect puzzle. 
 
Dubois & Louvet (1996), find negative returns on Mondays and Tuesdays and positive 
returns on Wednesdays for eleven indices in nine countries from 1969 to 1992. This 
study provides further international evidence for the presence of the day-of-the-week 
effect in local currency terms for a majority of stock markets in these countries. In this 
respect, it extends the analysis of most of the countries examined in Dubois & Louvet 
(1996) use the standard methodology as well as the moving average methodology and 
find returns to be lower at the beginning of the week (but not necessarily on Monday) 
for the full period. As in Chang et al. (1993), they observe the anomaly to disappear for 
the most recent period in the USA. However, the effect is still strong for European 
countries, Hong-Kong and Toronto market. 
 
Among the well-know explanations of the day-of-the-week effect are: closed-market 
hypothesis (French 1980), settlement procedures (Gibbons & Hess 1981; Lakonishok & 
Levi 1982; Solnik & Bousquet 1990), econometric methods, risk level, ex-dividend 
days (Lakonishok & Smidt 1988; Phillips-Patrick & Schneweis 1988) behavior of 
individual investors (Lakonishok & Maberly 1990), liquidity, time-zone theory 
(Condoyanni et al. 1987), previous week’s market performance, firm size and January 
effect (Rogalski 1984), nonsynchronous trading and bid-ask spreads (Gibbons & Hess 
1981), etc. However, based on the existing literature, no satisfactory explanation has 
been received yet. 
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3.3.1. Monday effect 
 
History recall Black Monday, on October 19, 1987 the Dow Jones Industrial Average 
(DJIA) lost almost 22% in a single day.  The crash started in Hong Kong and spread to 
the west. That event marked the beginning of a global stock market decline. By the end 
of the month, most of the major exchanges had dropped over 20% (Browning 2007). 
This became the most famous example of the “day-of-the-week” effect. 
 
Monday effect is the most well-know and the most frequently documented phenomenon 
from the day-of-the-week effects. Monday tends to be the worst day to be invested in 
stocks. The Monday effect (also known as the Weekend effect) can be described by the 
two following characteristics:  
- on average, returns on Mondays are statistically lower than those on the other 
days of the week; 
- the average return on Mondays is statistically less than zero. 
 
French (1980) reports that returns on the S&P 500 tend to be negative from Friday’s 
close to Monday’s close and that this is not simply a result of the longer three-day 
period between these closing prices. Gibbons and Hess (1981) confirmed the thrust of 
French’s (1980) findings using the CRSP equal-weighted and value-weighted market 
return indices. An interesting discovery is made by Keim and Stambaugh (1984) who 
suggest that the Monday effect is a weekend effect and that it is closely related to the 
January effect: during January, Monday returns are positive, while they become 
negative during the remaining part of the year. 
 
Academic researchers have spent considerable effort attempting to document and, with 
limited success, to explain the tendency for asset returns to be negative on Monday. 
Market practitioners identified the Monday effect at least as early as the 1920s, well in 
advance of the advent of studies manipulating electronic databases (Pettengill 2003: 3). 
Kelly (1930) cites a three-year statistical study that identified Mondays as the worse day 
to buy stocks. He ascribes the cause of the low Monday returns to, among other factors, 
weekend decision making processing by individual investors. One of the first studies 
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documenting a weekend effect is by Fields (1931) at a time when stocks traded on 
Saturdays. Later Fields (1934) also finds in a study that the DJIA commonly advanced 
the day before holidays. Several studies have shown that returns on Monday are worse 
than other days of the week.  
 
Harris (1986) studies intraday trading and finds that the weekend effect tended to occur 
in the first 45 minutes of trading as prices fall, but on all other days prices rise during 
the first 45 minutes. This anomaly presents the interesting question: Could the effect be 
caused by the moods of market participants? People are generally in better moods on 
Fridays and before holidays, but are generally grumpy on Mondays (in fact, suicides are 
more common on Monday than on any other day). Investors should however, keep in 
mind that the difference is small and could be difficult to take advantage of because of 
trading costs. 
 
Wang, Li and Erickson (1997) tried to document that the Monday effect occurs 
primarily in the last two weeks of the month because of the well known correlation 
between the Friday return and the Monday return. Additionally, they considered the 
expiration date of stock options (on the third Friday of the month) as one further cause 
of poor stock performance on the following Monday. However, the authors allege that 
both explanations cannot justify the Monday effect.  
 
A reverse weekend effect is the object of the research of Brusa, Liu and Schulman 
(2000). They discover that the Monday returns are significantly positive and they are 
higher than the returns of the other days of the week. From their results it emerges that 
large firms are subjected to traditional weekend effects whereas small firms are exposed 
to the reverse weekend effects. They also affirm that the trading of institutional 
investors in stocks of large firms contributes to the existence of the reverse weekend 
effect. According to their studies, the Monday returns would be positively correlated to 
those trading activities of institutional investors, which however, would exert a negative 
impact on the individual investors.  
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The analysis of Keef, Khaled and Zui (2009) suggests that in terms of information the 
poor countries are less efficient than rich countries and that a Monday effect weakening 
over time stands for a market efficiency increase. They examine 50 countries, where the 
observed between-country differences are characterised by an economic factor based on 
four indices. The prior day effect captures the tendency for price changes to follow 
those on the prior day. A bad (good) day occurs when the price change on the prior day 
is negative (positive). A panel regression with panel corrected standard errors, is used to 
characterize the way that the Monday effect and the related prior day effect 
systematically vary between countries over the period 1994 to 2006. At the start of the 
data in 1994, there is a considerable prior day effect which is larger for poor countries. 
This difference between countries declines over time and has essentially disappeared by 
2006. The bad non-Monday effect and the bad-Monday effect also decline over time. 
Further analysis with six leading economies provides evidence that the prior day 
influence on Mondays and non-Mondays dates back to at least 1973. 
 
Some findings question the stability of the Monday effect. Using hourly return data 
from 1963 to 1983, Smirlock and Starks (1986) find evidence of nonstationarities in the 
Monday effect. In the beginning of their sample (1963 – 1968), negative returns occur 
in every hour of trading on Mondays, while the Friday close to Monday open return is 
positive. In a later part of their sample (post-1974), the negative weekend effect results 
in negative average returns from Friday’s close to Monday’s open. So, as it is concluded 
by Connolly (1989: 134), Monday effect is time inconsistent – appears strongly in some 
time periods, nonexistent in other time periods, and weak in most time periods. 
 
What causes the Monday effect? The literature proposes a variety of explanations for 
occurrence of this phenomenon. Lakonishok and Maberly (1990) in their study report 
that investors tend to increase their trading activities, (particularly, sell orders) on 
Mondays. So, heavy sell orders might trigger bearish trend in the market causing 
negative returns. Damodaran (1989) reports that firms in general report bad news on 
Fridays. He claims that reporting and delay in reporting of bad news might cause the 
negative Monday effect. A research by Kamara (1997) shows that equity derivatives 
and the institutionalization of equity markets affects the Monday seasonal. However, 
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Keim (2008) suggests that if the pattern exists in so many different markets, it argues 
persuasively against many institution-specific explanations. Research has shown that 
the weekend effect cannot be explained by: differences in settlement periods for 
transactions occurring on different weekdays; measurement error in recorded prices; 
market maker trading activity; or systematic patterns in investor buying and selling 
behavior (Keim 2008). 
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4. DATA AND METHODOLOGY  
 
4.1. Data 
 
Data are obtained from Datastream which is widely recognized as the number one 
historical financial information provider, offering the highest quality and most 
comprehensive coverage in the world. It contains key data sets from both developed and 
emerging markets – equities, market indices, company accounts, macroeconomics, 
bonds, foreign exchange, interest rates, commodities and derivatives.  
 
Data of the present study represent daily closing values of the main stock market indices 
of 31 developed and developing countries. Originally it was planned to take the data for 
the period of 30 years in order to test properly the January/turn-of-the-year effect, but as 
for some countries it were not available for the entire period, it was decided to take two 
distinct data samples consisting of different time periods. The first sample is taken for 
the period from January 1, 1980 to February 11, 2011 which is used to test three effects: 
the January effect/turn-of-the-year effect (or TOY), turn-of-the-month effect (TOM) and 
day-of-the-week effect (DOW) in 11 countries. The second sample is for the period 
from January 2, 1991 to February 11, 2011 to test two effects – TOM and DOW – in 
remaining 20 countries. Table 2 (Panels A and B) presents the lists of countries in 
alphabetical order, their stock exchanges and names of indices which were taken for the 
analysis.   
 
Table 2. Countries, stock exchanges and stock market indices. 
 
Panel A: countries taken to test TOY, TOM & DOW  
 Country Stock Exchange 
Stock Market 
Index 
1.  Canada Toronto Stock Exchange 
S&P/TSX 
Composite 
2.  Germany Frankfurt Stock Exchange DAX 30 
3.   Hong Kong Stock Exchange Hang Seng 
4.  Japan Tokyo Stock Exchange TOPIX 
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Table 2. (continued) 
 
5.  Malaysia Malaysia Stock Exchange KLCI 
6.  South Korea Korea Stock Exchange KOSPI 
7.  Spain Madrid Stock Exchange IGBM 
8.  Sweden Stockholm Stock Exchange SWSEALI 
9.  Thailand Stock Exchange of Thailand SET Index 
10.  United Kingdom London Stock Exchange FTSE 100 
11.  United States  New York Stock Exchange S&P500 
Panel B: countries taken to test TOM & DOW 
1.  Austria Vienna Stock Exchange ATX 
2.  Belgium Euronext Brussels BEL 20 
3.  Brazil São Paulo Stock Exchange IBOVESPA 
4.  Chile Santiago Stock Exchange IGPA 
5.  Denmark Copenhagen Stock Exchange OMXC20 
6.  Finland Helsinki Stock Exchange OMXH25 
7.  Greece Athens Stock Exchange 
ATHEX 
Composite 
8.  Hungary Budapest Stock Exchange BUX 
9.  India Bombay Stock Exchange BSE 100 
10.  Indonesia Indonesia Stock Exchange JSX Composite 
11.  Ireland Irish Stock Exchange ISEQ 
12.  Israel Tel Aviv Stock Exchange TA-100 
13.  Mexico Mexican Stock Exchange IPC 
14.  Netherlands Euronext Amsterdam AEX 
15.  Norway Oslo Stock Exchange OSEAX 
16.  Pakistan Karachi Stock Exchange KSE 100 
17.  Peru Lima Stock Exchange IGBVL 
18.  Philippines Philippine Stock Exchange PSEi 
19.  Switzerland SIX Swiss Exchange SMI 
20.  Turkey Istanbul Stock Exchange 
ISE National-
100 
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4.2. Methodology 
 
Most researchers employ the simple linear regression model (French 1980; Gibbons and 
Hess 1981; Jaffe and Westerfield 1985). However, as Connolly (1989, 1991) claims, 
several specific problems may arise while using this approach:  
a) The returns are likely to be auto correlated;  
b) The residuals are possibly non-normal;  
c) The issue of heteroskedasticity may arise;  
d) Outliers with high/low value of return may distort the overall picture.  
 
Therefore Connolly (1989) suggests using GARCH on dummies, in order to deal with 
auto correlation and heteroskedasticity issues. Instead of considering heteroskedasticity 
as a problem to be corrected, the GARCH models treat heteroskedasticity as a variance 
to be modelled. As a result, not only are the deficiencies of least squares corrected, but a 
prediction is computed for the variance of each error term. GARCH (1,1) model is first 
proposed by Bollerslev (1986) and is admitted by previous studies as a well-fitting for 
modeling conditional volatility in financial time series (Akgiray 1989; Day and Lewis 
1992; Nelson 1982; Szakmary and Kiefer 2004).  
 
The methodology applied in the present paper is similar to that one used in the research 
of Szakmary and Kiefer (2004), because it tests all effects at the same time what is 
appropriate for this study. They claim that the method should be inclusive enough to 
provide robust estimates of the effects in the presence of numerous other features of 
index returns data that may interact with these effects. These features are:  
1. volatility clustering, which has been shown to be a key element of stock return 
series (French, Schwert & Stambaugh 1987; Akgiray 1989); 
2. previous studies find both positive autocorrelations in index returns, and positive 
cross-autocorrelations between large cap and small-cap portfolios (Campbell, Lo 
& MacKinlay 1997); 
3. mean returns across trading days, even outside the 19 trading days around the turn 
of the year, which are one of the main focus, have been shown to vary, for 
 40 
example,  in the following studies: French (1980), Dyl and Maberly (1986), 
Kamara (1997), Lakonishok & Smidt (1988). 
 
The following GARCH (1,1) model is used for the first data sample to test turn-of-the-
year, turn-of-the-month and day-of-the-week effects:  
 
(1)                Rt = a1MON + a2TUE + a3WED + a4THU + a5FRI +a6TOM  
                               + 
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 + et  
                            et ~ N(0, 
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2
  ttt ehh         
 
where Rt is the return of the stock market index (excluding dividends) on day t;  
MON, TUE, WED, THU, and FRI are dummy variables representing days of the week; 
TOM is a dummy variable equal to 1 on the last trading day and the first three trading 
days of each calendar month and zero otherwise;  
TD(i) are dummy variables representing trading days i (–8, –7, …, +9, +10) relative to 
the turn of the year, which equal 1 on trading day i and 0 otherwise; 
et is an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance; 
2
th is the conditional variance. 
 
Model used for the second data sample to test turn-of-the-month and day-of-the-week 
effects is as follows:  
 
(2)                Rt = a1MON + a2TUE + a3WED + a4THU + a5FRI + a6TOM 
                                     + 
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2
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2
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where Rt is the return of the stock market index (excluding dividends) on day t;  
MON, TUE, WED, THU, and FRI are dummy variables representing days of the week; 
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TOM is a dummy variable equal to 1 on the last trading day and the first three trading 
days of each calendar month and zero otherwise; 
et is an error term assumed to be normally distributed with zero mean and finite 
variance; 
2
th is the conditional variance. 
 
To capture the turn-of-the-year effect, and a possible migration of the effect to earlier in 
December, daily returns are examined for a total of 19 trading days [TD(i)] ranging 
from nine trading days prior to the turn of the year to ten trading days after. Thus, for 
example, TD(8) is the ninth trading day prior to the turn of the year, TD(0) is the last 
trading day in December, TD(1) is the first trading day in January, and TD(10) is the 
tenth trading day in January.  
 
The inclusion of day of the week and turn of the month dummy variables in the models, 
which are estimated using all days throughout the year, allows the coefficients on the 
turn-of-the-year days to be interpreted as the average return over and above the 
conditional return given the day of the week, and given whether the trading day falls 
into the turn of the month period. 
          
 
4.3. Hypotheses 
 
Summarizing the evidence from the previous literature, the following statements 
represent the most common findings: 
1. Significantly positive stock returns around the turn of the year; 
2. Positive stock returns around the turn of the month; 
3. Significantly negative average stock returns on Mondays; 
4. Strong negative Tuesday returns for some countries; 
5. Significantly positive stock returns on Fridays; 
 
In addition, each calendar effect can exist or not in particular country. Consequently, 
based on the previous findings the following testable hypotheses can be formulated: 
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Turn-of-the-year effect 
H
1.0
: The stock market returns are not significantly different from zero.  
H
1.1
: The stock market returns are significantly different from zero.  
 
Turn-of-the-month effect 
H
2.0
: The stock market returns are not significantly different from zero.  
H
2.1
: The stock market returns are significantly different from zero. 
 
Day-of-the-week effect 
H
3.0
: The stock market returns are not significantly different from zero.  
H
3.1
: The stock market returns are significantly different from zero. 
 
If the null hypotheses appear to be true, this would mean that the market is efficient and 
rational traders can not take advantages from trading at specific time in calendar. And 
on the contrary, if the null hypotheses are rejected, this means that the market is 
efficient and market participants can exploit calendar anomalies to make profits.  
 
Of course, it can happen and will be natural if calendar effects are different from 
country to country. But also it is logically to expect some similarities in countries from 
the same regions, e.g. Europe, Asia, Pacific region, South and North Americas, or 
countries with the same level of development, i.e. developed or emerging ones.  
 43 
5. EMPIRICAL RESULTS 
 
The empirical results of GARCH (1,1) estimation of calendar effects in the countries 
from both data samples are presented in the Table 3 and Table 4. Tables are divided into 
panels A, B, and C which present countries by regions: Europe, Asia, North and South 
Americas. This makes it more convenient to make a comparison of countries from the 
same regions.  
 
Table 3 presents the results of testing the countries from the first data sample for the 
existence of turn-of-the-year, turn-of-the-month and day-of-the-week effects for the 
period January 1, 1980 – February 11, 2011. The significance of coefficients is taken at 
1% level to pick up the most significant ones.  
 
From the table it is seen that turn-of-the-year effect does not exist in the investigated 
countries, except Malaysia. The returns during the turn of the year in Malaysia are 
significantly positive at 1% level. The non-existence of the January/turn-of-the-year 
effect is consistent for the following countries with Giovanis (2009) who uses 
approximately the same time period: Germany, UK, South Korea, Hong Kong, 
Thailand, Canada and US. As said previously, several studies prove that the January/ 
turn-of-the-year effect existed before, but has disappeared or diminished over the recent 
period. The present study examines the data from 1980 till 2011 without splitting the 
data into subperiods and the results are shown for the entire period, so they do not show 
the possible existence of the effect in the early years. Also, January/turn-of-the-year 
effect is more attributed to small-cap stocks, but the present study focuses on indices 
which consist of large-cap stocks.  
 
Turn-of-the-month effect is the most observed phenomenon among investigated 
countries, it exists almost in all of them (except Japan, Malaysia and Thailand) with 
significantly positive returns at 1% level. This is consistent with Giovanis (2009) for 
Germany, UK, South Korea, Hong Kong, Canada and US, who found turn-of-the-month 
effect in most countries examined in his study.  
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Table 3. Results of GARCH (1,1) estimation of DOW, TOM, TOY effects. 
 
Panel A: Europe 
 Germany Spain Sweden United Kingdom 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON -0.008 -0.784 0.433 0.025 2.565 0.010 0.016 1.122 0.262 -0.007 -0.861 0.389 
TUE -0.007 -0.599 0.549 0.003 0.290 0.772 -0.001 -0.087 0.931 0.009 1.091 0.275 
WED 0.030* 2.943 0.003 0.004 0.460 0.645 0.002 0.127 0.899 0.030* 3.890 0.000 
THU 0.022 1.904 0.057 0.025 2.504 0.012 0.035 2.479 0.013 0.013 1.492 0.136 
FRI 0.030* 2.934 0.003 0.033* 3.508 0.001 0.044* 3.022 0.003 0.028* 3.386 0.001 
TOM 0.074* 6.221 0.000 0.043* 3.838 0.000 0.119* 8.451 0.000 0.045* 4.748 0.000 
TOY 0.023 1.310 0.190 0.037 2.300 0.022 0.024 1.037 0.300 0.018 1.322 0.186 
δ 0.006* 13.354 0.000 0.004* 19.359 0.000 0.076* 18.004 0.000 0.003* 9.434 0.000 
θ 0.880* 184.27 0.000 0.884* 204.11 0.000 0.638* 32.449 0.000 0.887* 159.41 0.000 
γ 0.106* 27.923 0.000 0.010* 23.872 0.000 0.128* 14.774 0.000 0.097* 20.434 0.000 
 
Panel B: Asia 
 Japan Malaysia South Korea Thailand 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON 0.027* 3.748 0.000 -0.029* -3.191 0.001 0.020 1.876 0.061 -0.026* -3.155 0.002 
TUE -0.016 -1.772 0.076 0.004 0.364 0.716 -0.019 -1.195 0.232 0.002 0.201 0.840 
WED 0.043* 5.065 0.000 0.021 2.203 0.028 0.028 1.981 0.048 0.016 1.984 0.047 
THU 0.025* 2.990 0.003 0.037* 3.764 0.000 0.032* 2.639 0.004 0.014 1.711 0.087 
FRI 0.020 2.373 0.018 0.051* 5.208 0.000 0.048* 2.925 0.007 0.050* 5.270 0.000 
TOM 0.020 1.842 0.066 0.012 1.104 0.270 0.050* 3.219 0.001 -0.015 -1.638 0.101 
TOY 0.028 2.010 0.045 0.064* 3.251 0.001 0.044 2.095 0.053 0.018 0.972 0.331 
δ 0.002* 8.788 0.000 0.005* 20.787 0.000 0.007* 16.633 0.000 0.001* 10.756 0.000 
θ 0.883* 246.43 0.000 0.867* 249.34 0.000 0.899* 256.94 0.000 0.883* 268.70 0.000 
γ 0.123* 35.775 0.000 0.127* 27.765 0.000 0.088* 24.855 0.000 0.136* 27.937 0.000 
 
 Hong Kong    
 Estimate z-stat p-value          
MON -0.001 -0.109 0.913          
TUE 0.018 1.312 0.190          
WED 0.045* 3.399 0.001          
THU 0.035* 2.625 0.009          
FRI 0.051* 3.779 0.000          
TOM 0.065* 3.970 0.000          
TOY 0.048 1.919 0.055          
δ 0.010* 15.472 0.000          
θ 0.867* 205.76 0.000          
γ 0.122* 37.401 0.000          
*denotes the significance at 1% level 
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Table 3. (continued) 
 
Panel C: North America 
 Canada United States 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON -0.013 -1.769 0.077 0.015 1.586 0.113 
TUE 0.003 0.455 0.649 0.014 1.620 0.105 
WED 0.024* 3.299 0.001 0.036* 3.710 0.000 
THU 0.015 2.225 0.026 0.013 1.445 0.149 
FRI 0.023* 3.105 0.002 0.011 1.316 0.188 
TOM 0.044* 4.921 0.000 0.027* 2.668 0.008 
TOY 0.025 1.887 0.059 0.008 0.564 0.573 
δ 0.002* 13.644 0.000 0.002* 11.252 0.000 
θ 0.887* 275.81 0.000 0.920* 363.72 0.000 
γ 0.102* 34.739 0.000 0.071* 44.348 0.000 
* denotes the significance at 1% level 
 
The day-of-the-week anomaly has variations from country to country. Like the turn-of-
the-month effect, the day-of-the-week anomaly exists in all investigated stock market 
indexes and the returns are significantly positive almost in all cases. The exceptions are 
Thailand and Malaysia with “traditional” weekend effect when the returns are 
significantly negative on Mondays and significantly positive on Fridays, and in 
addition, Malaysia has significantly positive Thursday returns (consistent with Giovanis 
(2009) for Thailand, and with Chan, Khanthavit and Thomas (1996) – for Malaysia). 
 
The US stock market index S&P 500 shows significantly positive returns on 
Wednesdays, which is consistent with Cho, Linton and Whang (2007). In their study 
Cho et al. (2007) examine the Monday effect in US using S&P 500 approximately 
during the same period and report that this effect in S&P 500 has weakened post 1987. 
From the results of their study it can be seen that returns on Wednesdays are 
significantly positive. Kamara (1997) reports that the weekend effect, while still exists, 
has diminished significantly since the introduction of the S&P 500 futures contract in 
1982. He claims that the Monday effect is not statistically significant in the DJIA and 
S&P 500 indices that are dominated by large and mature firms. 
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In Germany, United Kingdom and Canada the returns on Wednesdays and Fridays are 
significantly higher than on other weekdays. Interestingly, Wednesday returns are 
approximately equal to Friday returns. In Spain and Sweden the day of significantly 
positive returns is only Friday, while for Japan these days are Monday, Wednesday and 
Thursday, for Korea – Thursday and Friday, and for Hong Kong – Wednesday, 
Thursday and Friday. So, the null hypothesis appears to be valid for the turn-of-the-year 
effect (except Malaysia) and is rejected for the turn-of-the-month effect for most of the 
countries and for the day-of-the-week – for all countries.  
 
Table 4 presents the results of testing the countries from the second data sample for the 
existence of turn-of-the-month and day-of-the-week effects for the period 1991 – 2011. 
As in the previous table, here turn-of-the-month effect also exists almost in all 
countries, except Indonesia and Pakistan, and the returns are significantly positive at 1% 
level. For Brazil, Mexico, Netherlands, Norway and Turkey these findings are 
consistent with Giovanis (2009). 
 
Unlike the first data sample, day-of-the-week effect is found not in all countries, but it 
also presents different variations among countries. There is no effect in Austria, 
Belgium, Denmark, India and Israel. The “traditional” weekend effect is found in 
Greece: it has negative Monday and positive Friday returns, and in addition, negative 
Tuesday returns. Chile has significantly negative returns on Mondays, and significantly 
positive returns on all other weekdays, except Tuesday, with the largest return on Friday 
equal to 0.053 percent. This can be also considered as a “traditional” weekend effect. 
Other countries present various combinations of the day-of-the-week effect. 
 
The fact, that the weekend effect is not found in most countries as it was expected, has a 
reasonable explanation. Brusa, Liu and Schulman (2003) noted that all studies using 
pre-1987 data (e.g. Keim 1987) document the weekend effect and studies using post-
1988 data (Kamara 1997; Steeley 2001) tend to document the effect diminishing or 
disappearing. An interesting suggestion is proposed by Keef et al. (2009). They claim 
that Monday effect weakening over time stands for a market efficiency increase.  
 
 47 
Table 4. Results of GARCH (1,1) estimation of DOW, TOM effects. 
 
Panel A: Europe 
 Austria Belgium Denmark Finland 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON 0.014 1.130 0.259 0.008 0.704 0.482 0.003 0.244 0.807 0.017 1.018 0.309 
TUE 0.018 1.341 0.180 0.006 0.508 0.611 0.020 1.527 0.127 0.009 0.559 0.576 
WED 0.015 1.152 0.249 0.007 0.663 0.507 0.022 1.782 0.075 0.019 1.217 0.224 
THU 0.017 1.243 0.214 0.015 1.430 0.153 0.011 0.862 0.389 0.041* 2.655 0.008 
FRI 0.013 0.975 0.329 0.014 1.322 0.186 0.012 0.819 0.413 0.050* 2.968 0.003 
TOM 0.067* 4.404 0.000 0.079* 6.153 0.000 0.074* 5.039 0.000 0.068* 3.399 0.001 
δ 0.008* 11.468 0.000 0.005* 15.971 0.000 0.006* 14.867 0.000 0.005* 7.327 0.000 
θ 0.864* 122.82 0.000 0.855* 116.37 0.000 0.891* 154.80 0.000 0.913* 201.05 0.000 
γ 0.109* 18.885 0.000 0.119* 17.899 0.000 0.085* 16.613 0.000 0.078* 18.945 0.000 
 
 Greece Hungary Ireland Netherlands 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON -0.046* -3.113 0.002 0.041* 2.661 0.008 -0.015 -1.260 0.208 0.032* 2.610 0.009 
TUE -0.049* -3.144 0.002 0.002 0.115 0.908 0.011 0.962 0.336 0.013 0.999 0.318 
WED 0.003 0.208 0.835 0.010 0.670 0.503 0.019 1.786 0.074 0.005 0.406 0.685 
THU 0.019 1.281 0.200 0.005 0.311 0.756 0.035* 3.072 0.002 0.015 1.257 0.209 
FRI 0.051* 2.739 0.006 0.023 1.270 0.204 0.026 2.117 0.034 0.010 0.796 0.426 
TOM 0.010* 5.183 0.000 0.067* 3.221 0.001 0.055* 4.068 0.000 0.060* 4.331 0.000 
δ 0.011* 11.439 0.000 0.017* 16.911 0.000 0.003* 9.177 0.000 0.003* 10.611 0.000 
θ 0.841* 128.83 0.000 0.823* 169.7 0.000 0.913* 183.27 0.000 0.896* 157.38 0.000 
γ 0.146* 20.370 0.000 0.151* 36.210 0.000 0.078* 16.606 0.000 0.093* 16.920 0.000 
 
 Norway Switzerland Turkey  
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value    
MON 0.010 0.773 0.439 0.025* 2.121 0.034 -0.015 -0.595 0.552    
TUE 0.001 0.057 0.955 -0.002 -0.177 0.859 -0.008 -0.260 0.795    
WED 0.003 0.279 0.780 0.012 0.966 0.334 0.094* 3.244 0.001    
THU 0.067* 5.617 0.000 0.012 1.042 0.297 0.102* 3.682 0.000    
FRI 0.061* 4.201 0.000 0.029 2.454 0.014 0.073 2.327 0.020    
TOM 0.068* 4.515 0.000 0.071* 5.133 0.000 0.102* 3.086 0.002    
δ 0.010* 10.765 0.000 0.008* 15.380 0.000 0.018* 7.867 0.000    
θ 0.001* 112.37 0.000 0.854* 99.532 0.000 0.903* 233.85 0.000    
γ 0.003* 17.360 0.000 0.112* 14.556 0.000 0.086* 21.456 0.000    
* denotes the significance at 1% level 
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Table 4. (continued) 
 
Panel B: Asia 
 India Indonesia Israel Pakistan 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON 0.037 2.359 0.018 -0.022 -1.637 0.102 0.039 2.180 0.029 -0.030 -2.012 0.044 
TUE -0.006 -0.324 0.746 -6.87E-05 -0.005 0.996 0.021 1.272 0.204 0.042 2.520 0.012 
WED 0.020 1.195 0.232 0.045* 3.292 0.001 -0.006 -0.388 0.698 0.073* 4.324 0.000 
THU 0.015 0.877 0.381 0.042* 3.092 0.002 0.036 2.224 0.026 0.044 2.406 0.016 
FRI 0.041 2.499 0.013 0.071* 5.449 0.000 0.025 1.806 0.071 0.002 0.125 0.900 
TOM 0.091* 5.164 0.000 0.021 1.304 0.192 0.093* 5.043 0.000 0.041 2.232 0.026 
δ 0.009* 9.703 0.000 0.003* 11.068 0.000 0.011* 10.978 0.000 0.015* 18.192 0.000 
θ 0.874* 165.95 0.000 0.896* 291.98 0.000 0.872* 127.70 0.000 0.824* 156.19 0.000 
γ 0.116* 21.670 0.000 0.104* 25.800 0.000 0.102* 16.910 0.000 0.151* 23.028 0.000 
 
 Philippines    
 Estimate z-stat p-value          
MON -0.020 -1.109 0.267          
TUE -0.045 -2.567 0.010          
WED 0.020 1.212 0.226          
THU 0.055* 3.227 0.001          
FRI 0.045 2.477 0.013          
TOM 0.104* 5.357 0.000          
δ 0.021* 11.912 0.000          
θ 0.828* 105.33 0.000          
γ 0.131* 28.983 0.000          
 
Panel C: South America 
 Brazil Chile Mexico Peru 
 Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value Estimate z-stat p-value 
MON -0.003 -0.088 0.929 -0.033* -4.131 0.000 0.008 0.488 0.625 0.037* 2.702 0.007 
TUE 0.055 1.772 0.076 -0.003 -0.328 0.743 0.027 1.722 0.085 -0.001 -0.074 0.941 
WED 0.127* 4.072 0.000 0.026* 3.266 0.001 0.060* 3.551 0.000 0.026 1.758 0.079 
THU 0.066 2.323 0.020 0.043* 5.252 0.000 0.062* 3.555 0.000 0.041* 3.092 0.002 
FRI 0.124* 3.584 0.000 0.053* 6.373 0.000 0.038 2.125 0.034 0.099* 6.819 0.000 
TOM 0.099* 2.774 0.006 0.043* 4.131 0.000 0.098* 4.796 0.000 0.066* 3.745 0.000 
δ 0.040* 36.405 0.000 0.002* 8.202 0.000 0.008* 8.693 0.000 0.010* 12.825 0.000 
θ 0.884* 286.08 0.000 0.837* 117.16 0.000 0.886* 160.39 0.000 0.803* 138.05 0.000 
γ 0.082* 25.560 0.000 0.148* 18.709 0.000 0.104* 20.753 0.000 0.179* 24.697 0.000 
* denotes the significance at 1% level 
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Summarizing the results from the both data samples, it is seen that the turn-of-the-year 
effect does not exist in stock markets from the first data sample (except Malaysia), the 
turn-of-the-month and the day-of-the-week effects are found in 26 countries out of 31. 
The day-of-the-week anomaly presents various differences across countries. 
“Traditional” weekend effect with negative Monday returns and positive Friday returns 
is found in Thailand, and with small variations in Malaysia and Greece. For Scandinavia 
the turn-of-the-month effect, Thursday and Friday effects are observed, except Sweden 
which has only Friday effect. Interestingly, negative returns on Tuesdays were not 
found at 1% significance level in Japan, Korea, Malaysia, Philippines, Thailand and 
Hong Kong as it is presented by other studies in earlier years (Jaffe & Westerfield 1985; 
Dubois & Louvet 1996; Kim 1988; Ho 1990). So, this means that the day-of-the-week 
effect is changing with time. In both data samples all GARCH parameters for all stock 
market indices are statistically significant.  
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6. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The present paper adopts and carefully applies a procedure which examines the calendar 
effects in 31 developed and developing countries. The anomalies which are investigated 
are turn-of-the-year effect, turn-of-the-month effect and day-of-the-week effect. Two 
data samples with unequal time periods are analyzed: the first sample is from January 1, 
1980 to February 11, 2011, and the second one is for the period from January 2, 1991 to 
February 11, 2011. The anomalies are tested with GARCH (1,1) model using the 
methodology proposed by Szakmary and Kiefer (2004).  
 
The study presented adequate challenges to the author. Results appeared to be different 
from what was expected. The research shows that the turn-of-the-year effect is not 
found in observed countries except Malaysia, which means that the effect has totally 
disappeared during the recent years in analyzed countries. The turn-of-the-month and 
the day-of-the-week anomalies still exist in the majority of the analyzed stock markets. 
In all countries where it is found, the returns during the turn of the month are 
significantly positive at 1% level. The day-of-the-week effect provides some variations 
across countries. 
 
The results of this study and others similar to it may be important for financial 
managers, financial counselors and investors interested in international diversification. 
Its relevance lies in the direct bearing of its results on the timing and nature of 
investment decisions (Boudreaux 1995: 15). Compiling together all the available results 
from this and other studies on the calendar effects investors and other financiers can 
choose their own strategy of investing and diversify their assets by allocating them to 
the financial markets of the countries which show the highest return during definite 
periods of time of the year, month and week.  
 
The existence of predictable seasonal behavior in stock returns may lead to profitable 
trading strategies, and in turn, abnormal returns. Seasonality is an important factor of 
predictable behaviors in stock returns. Investors have long been fascinated by the 
possibility of finding systematic patterns in stock prices that, once detected, promise 
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easy profits when exploited by simple trading rules. Calendar effects have a significant 
economic value if it is possible for investors to use them in a trading strategy. The 
development of such strategies can be a matter of interest for the further research. 
 
Summarizing the conclusions, one interesting issue comes to the mind: if in some 
countries there are no calendar effects, does it mean that the market is/became efficient? 
Keef et al. (2009) claim that the effects are likely to disappear in advanced economies. 
Does this mean that if the economy that achieved advanced level became efficient? The 
term “efficient” itself means something rational and advanced. Thus, if the economy is 
advanced then markets are efficient, and from this follows that investors are not able to 
earn excess returns in such economies. In such case the Efficient Market Hypothesis and 
the Random Walk Theory will become true some day. And it will not be possible for 
market participants to earn profit systematically from market inefficiencies. Therefore, 
the question arises: Is this good and for whom?  
 
As the efficiency is the sign of advanced economy, the question can be answered: it is 
good for everyone – better to be advanced and efficient than not advanced and 
inefficient. Therefore, market inefficiency is good just for a part of people; for those, 
who can get more information than others and then use it, making abnormal returns. 
And it can be bad for the rest of the society, because this part of people can manipulate 
markets seeking their own goals. In order to prevent this, it is necessary to eliminate 
inefficiency and aspire to reach the advanced level in economies. Achieving the market 
efficiency can be another option for the further research.  
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